Disregarding the Entity of Private Corporations [Part 1] by Horowitz, Charles
Washington Law Review 
Volume 14 Number 4 
11-1-1939 
Disregarding the Entity of Private Corporations [Part 1] 
Charles Horowitz 





 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles Horowitz, Disregarding the Entity of Private Corporations [Part 1], 14 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 285 
(1939). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol14/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 




Although the device of incorporation has a number of advantages
over other types of business organization such as partnerships,1 joint
stock companies,' and common law trusts,3 the advantage that has
*Of the Seattle Bar.
'Thus a partner's death dissolved a partnership, but a stockholder's
death had no such effect on a corporation. The sale of a partner's interest
in a firm dissolved it, but the sale of stock by a stockholder had no
effect on the identity of the company. Partners were agents for one
another in the prosecution of the firm business, but stockholders, while
owners, were not agents for one another. The liability of individuals and
partners for firm debts was unlimited; the liability df stockholders, except
in cases of superadded statutory liability (as in the case of bank stock),
was limited to the price paid or the stock subscription contract. Finally,
a partnership as such, except for limited purposes (e. g., In re Sugar
Valley Gin Co., 292 Fed. 508 (D. C. Ga. 1923), partnership may be adjudi-
cated bankrupt as a "person") had no legal personality. Thus real estate
could not be held in the firm name, nor suit brought in its name. On the
other hand, a distinctive feature of the corporation was that it had legal
personality. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435 (1934);
Sneed v. Santiam River Timber Co., 122 Ore. 652, 260 Pac. 237 (1927);
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry Co., 160 Tenn. 57, 22 S. W. (2d)
6 (1929). It could contract, acquire, own and dispose of property, and
within the limits of its charter or articles of incorporation could deal
and be dealt with largely as with a human being. Salomon v. Salomon
& Co. (1897) A. C. 22, 30; 1 FLETCHER, CycLOPrIA OF PRIVATE CoRPoRATIoNs
(1931) § 22. The theory of corporate personality has been the subject of
much discussion and criticism. See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson,
222 N. Y. Supp. 532, 539 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v.
Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189, 56 N. E. 1033, 1035 (1900); Deiser, The Juristic
Person (1908) 57 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 131, 216, 300; Machen, Corporate Per-
sonality (1911) 24 HARv. L. REv. 253, 347; Radin, The Endless Problem of
Corporate Personality (1932) 32 COL. L. Rv. 643, 647.
2Resort to joint stock company organization was had in order to elimi-
nate some of the disadvantages of doing business as partners, such as the
dissolution of the firm following the death of a partner or the transfer
of his interest or the liability resulting from the agency character of part-
nerships. These disadvantages it largely succeeded in eliminating, suc-
ceeding also in enabling the pooling of funds of small investors. But
disadvantages remained. Thus in the absence of a statute to the contrary,
such a company could neither acquire nor convey property by firm name,
nor sue or be sued in the firm name; and in many cases joint stockholders
were individually liable on the company's contracts and debts. For
additional differences see WomiRsER, DISREGARD or =H CORPOATE FIcTION
AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS (1927) 101. *
'Common law trusts attained popularity in Massachusetts, being there
used for the purpose of evading restrictions on the right of corporations
to deal in real estate. Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624, 627
(1930). As gradually developed, they became known as "Massachusetts
Trusts", becoming elaborate types of business organization largely re-
sembling corporations whose advantages they sought to acquire, and
whose disadvantages they sought to eliminate. Nevertheless courts were
often inclined to impose unlimited partnership liability on certificate
holders, or strict personal liability on trustees, as well as to occasionally
make applicable to such trusts tax and other statutes dealing with cor-
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held the greatest appeal to prospective stockholders has been the
advantage of limited liability.4 This advantage probably accounts for
the widespread popularity of incorporation as a business device. In the
last 100 years corporate growth has been such that it dominates the
business life of the country.5
It has become apparent with the passage of time, however, that the
device of incorporation can be used in such a way as to frustrate the
legitimate purposes or effects of incorporation. In addition to statu-
tory regulation, therefore, courts have been compelled to remedy this
situation "to do justice". It has been principally in connection with this
effort that the doctrine of disregarding corporate entity has been de-
veloped.
The reasons assigned by courts of law,6 equity7 and admiralty,8 and
even administrative bodies,9 in disregarding corporate entity have been
general and varied. Metaphors have been used in abundance. 10 Some-
times it has been stated that the corporate entity is disregarded be-
cause the privilege of doing business in the corporate form has been
abused," or that the corporate entity will be disregarded because justice
porations. Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 890; see also State ex rel. Range v.
Hinkle, 126 Wash. 581, 219 Pac. 41 (1923).
'Hanson v. Bradley, - Mass. -, 10 N. E. (2d) 259 (1937).
BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRVATE PROPERTY
(1932). The advantages and disadvantages of incorporation today have
recently been examined. See Bredell, Reexamination of the Desirability
of the Corporate Form of Business Organization (1938) 13 IND. L. J. 533.
'Llewellyn Iron Works v. Abbott Kinney Co., 172 Cal. 210, 155 Pac. 986,
987 (1916); Erkenbrecher v. Grant, 187 Cal. 7, 200 Pac. 641 (1921).
'Martin v. D. B. Martin Co., 10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 At. 612 (1913); Ayer &
Lord Tie Co. v Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 606, 271 S. W. 693 (1925); Home
Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903); Dillard & Coffin
Co. v. Richmond Cotton Oil Co., 140 Tenn. 290, 204 S. W. 758 (1918);
Landa v. Whitfield, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 131 S. W. (2d) 310 (1939).
'See Young v. The Key City, 14 Wall. 653 (U. S. 1872); Kingston Dry
Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 2d,
1929).
'Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 F. (2d) 226 (W. D. Wis. 1930); Brooks-
Scanlon Co. v. R. R. Comm., 144 La. 1086, 81 So. 727 (1919); Ohio Mining
Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 106 Ohio St. 138, 140 N. E. 143 (1922).
"Courts have referred to the corporate entity disregarded as "adjunct",
"agency", "instrumentality", "creature", "mouthpiece", "alter ego", "alias",
"device", "dummy", "tool", "corporate double" and "business conduit".
The late Justice Cardozo once observed that the relationship between a
parent and subsidiary corporation is "still enveloped in mists of meta-
phor". Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E.
58 (1926).
"State ex rel. Attorney General v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137,
30 N. E. 279, 287 (1892). Accord in principle: Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P.
Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Assn., 247 U. S. 490 (1918);
Radio-Craft Co. Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.. Co., 7 F. (2d) 432
(C. C. A. 3d, 1925); State v. Creamery Pkg. Mfg. Co., 110 Minn. 415, 126
N. W. 126 (1910); POWELL, PARENT AND SuBsIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1931) 6;
WORMSER, op. cit. supra note 2 at 10, 24; Comment (1925) 13 CAm. L. Rzv.
235. In Newark Ladder & Bracket Sales Co. v. Furniture Workers Union
Local 66, 125 N. J. Eq. 99, 4 Atl. (2d) 49, the court disregarded corporate
entity of family corporation because not within the reason or policy of
the legal fiction.
DISREGARDING CORPORATE- ENTITY
requires it,12 or that the court must look to the substance and not to
the shadow;' 8 sometimes the court has stated that the entity would be
disregarded because it was a mere agency or instrumentality of the
defendant sought to be held liable; 14 and sometimes the court has said
that the adverse party was identical with the corporate entity disre-
garded. 1 5 The various reasons assigned by the courts have been by
"Phoenix Safety Investment Co. v. James, 28 Ariz. 514, 237 Pac. 958
(1925); Markovitz v. Markovitz, - Pa. -, 8 At. (2d) 36 (1939); Stony
Brook Lbr. Co. v. Blackman, 286 Pa. 305, 133 Atl. 556 (1926). Accord in
principle: Gonzales & Co., Brokers, Inc. v. Thomas, 42 Ariz. 308, 25 P.
(2d) 552 (1933); Montgomery v. Central Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich.
142, 255 N. W. 274 (1934); Knight v. Burns, 22 Ohio App. 482, 154 N. E. 345
(1926); Pittsburgh Reflector Company v. Dwyer & Rhodes Co., 173 Wash.
552, 555, 23 P. (2d) 1114 (1933).
"Consumers Const. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 94 F. (2d)
731 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938); Western Securities Company v. Spiro, 62 Utah
623, 221 Pac. 856 (1923). Accord in principle: Cross v. Globe-Boss-World
Furniture Co., 63 F. (2d) 421 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); E. E. Gray Corporation
v. Meehan, 54 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931); Gates Rubber Co. v. B. F.
Goodrich Rubber Co., 45 F. (2d) 652 (D. Colo. 1930); Kingston Dry Dock
Co. v. Lake Champlain Transportation Co., 31 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 2d,
1929); Mosher v. Lee, 32 Ariz. 560, 261 Pac. 35 (1927); Steinen v. J. P.
Stotter Co., 22 Ohio App. 249, 154 N. E. 66 (1926); Knight v. Burns, 22
Ohio App. 482, 154 N. E. 345 (1926); Gallatin Natural Gas Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 79 Mont. 269, 256 Pac. 373 (1927).
"Oriental Investment Co. v. Barklay, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 64 S. W. 80(1901). Accord in principle: Interstate Tel. Co. v. B. & 0. Tel Co., 51
Fed. 49 (C. C. D. Md. 1892), affd. 54 Fed. 50 (C. C. A. 4th, 1893); In re
Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905); In re Reiger, Kapner
& Altmark, 157 Fed. 609 (S. D. Ohio, 1907); see New York Trust Co. v.
Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); Martin v. D. B. Martin & Co.,
10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 Atl. 612 (1913); Mitchell v. Lea Lumber Co., 43 Wash.
195, 86 Pac. 405 (1906); DeLano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 Pac.
273 (1926). In Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Cor-
porations (1925) 14 CAmr. L. Rsv. 12, it is stated that most of the cases
of "one man" corporations "can be explained by a liberal application of
ordinary agency rules".
1U. S. v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 220 U. S. 257, 272 (1911). Accord in
principle: W. R. Grace & Co. v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1920); Bishop v. U. S., 16 F. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Jackson
v. Thomas Inv. Co., 46 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (alter ego rule);
Minifie v Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921); Davis v. Perry, 120
Cal. App. 670, 8 P. (2d) 514 (1932); see Martin v. D. B. Martin Co., 10 Del.
Ch. 211, 88 Atl. 612 (1913); Associated Oil Company v. The Seiberling
Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204, 19 P. (2d) 940 (1933) (confusion of identities).
The identity theory is often illustrated though not necessarily expressly
relied on in cases applying the rule that the successor, merged or consoli-
dated corporation is liable for the debts of its predecessor. In re W. J.
Marshall, 3 F. (2d) 192 (S. D. Ga. 1924); Sheild v. Smith, 53 S. D. 477,
221 N. W. 87 (1928); Cattle Raisers' Loan Co. v. Sutton, 271 S. W. 233
(Tex. Civ. App., 1925); Jones v. Francis, 70 Wash. 676, 126 Pac. 307 (1912);
see In re Armbruster Store Co., 66 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933). Like-
wise predecessor is liable for debts of successor. Davis Provis. Co. v.
Fowler Bros., 47 N. Y. $upp. 205, affd. 163 N. Y. 580, 57 N. E. 1108 (1900).
The relation between the agency and identity theories in parent and
subsidiary corporation. cases has been examined but no satisfactory con-
clusion reached as to the true view. POWELL, op. cit. supra note 11 at 89
et seq., 116 et seq. Some cases can be rested both on the agency and iden-
tity theories. Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 248 Fed. 953
(E. D. Va., 1918) 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S.
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no means inconsistent and occasionally a single decision has made full
use of all of them. Thus in United States v. Reading,16 an attempt to
evade the Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act was frustrated. In
disregarding the corporate entity for the purpose of enforcing the act,
the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"* * * Where such ownership of stock is resorted to, not
for the purpose of participating in the affairs of the corpora-
tion in which it is held in a manner normal and usual with
stockholders, but for the purpose of making it a mere agent,
or instrumentality or department of another company, the
courts will look through the forms to the realities of the rela-
tion between the companies as if the corporate agency did not
exist and will deal with them as the justice of the case may
require.""
Just when a court will disregard a corporate entity has been a sub-
ject of frequent discussion, 8 but so far as examination reveals, tests
for disregarding the entity, suggested both in the decisions and by
law writers, have either been a mere summary of particular situations, 9
or have not been inclusive of sufficient factual situations calling for
644 (1920); Spokane Merchants Association v. Clere Clothing Co., 84 Wash.
616, 147 Pac. 414 (1915). Other cases are best rested on the agency theory,
such as those denying recovery against a parent corporation for the debts
of its subsidiary if the transaction involved occurred before the parent
corporation had assumed control: Allen v. Phila. Co., 265 Fed. 817 (C. C.
A. 3rd, 1920); Hooper-Mankin Co. v. Matthew Addy Co., 4 F. (2d) 187 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1925); Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F. (2d) 720 (C. C. A.
8th, 1927); or cases denying recovery against a subsidiary for the acts
of its parent. Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31
F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). The identity theory would clearly require
contrary holdings. Cases holding that service of process on a domestic
subsidiary corporation is not valid service on a foreign parent corpora-
tion while not involving substantive liability are also better rested on
the agency theory. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S.
333 (1925).
1253 U. S. 26, 62 (1920).
"See also: Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic
Assn., 247 U. S. 490 (1918); Page v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 53 F.
(2d) 27 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) (applying doctrine to common law trusts);
State Trust & Say. Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co., 30 N. Mex. 566,
240 Pac. 469 (1925); Stony Brook Lumber Co. v. Blackman, 286 Pa. 305, 133
Atl. 556 (1926); Caldwell v. Roach, 44 Wyo. 319, 12 P. (2d) 376 (1932).
"In re Clarke's Will, - Minn. -, 284 N. W. 876 (1939), the court rejected
the doctrine as unnecessary but substituted reasoning equally unsatis-
factory because of vagueness. In re Witkind's Estate, 4 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 933,
167 Misc. Rep. 885 (Surr. Ct. 1938), defines a corporation not in terms of
personality which may have to be disregarded but as a name for a useful
and usual collection of jural relations to be assigned to their appropriate
place, having due regard to the purposes to be achieved.
"Callas v. Independent Taxi Owners' Ass'n, 66 F. (2d) 192 (App. D. C.,
1933); Jacoby v. Duncan, 138 Misc. Rep. 777, 247 N. Y. Supp. 318 (Sup.
Ct., 1931); Continental Supply Co. v. Forrest E. Gilmore Co. of Texas, 55
S. W. (2d) 622 (Tex. Civ. App., 1932). See Ballantine, Separate Entity of
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1925) 14 CALIF. L. REv. 12; WORMSER,
loc. cit. supra note 2.
DISREGARDING CORPORATE ENTITY
the application of the doctrine.20
If principles can be ferreted out of the decisions which will be rea-
sonably certain of application, preserving the legitimate immunity of
incorporation, and yet sufficiently resilient to provide for growth,2' -
definite progress will have been made in a field of law still recognized as
being in a state of uncertainty. In what follows, therefore, it is pro-
posed to examine applicable principles in an effort to determine the
nature of the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity and to deter-
mine just when the doctrine should be applied. 22 In referring to the
doctrine of regarding or disregarding the corporate entity hereafter,
it will be for convenience and on occasion be referred to as the doctrine
of regard or the doctrine of disregard.
II.
Som FACTORS INVOLVED IN APPLYING TH DOCTRINE
Except for the doctrine of corporate immunity, stockholders would
usually be liable as partners for the acts of a corporation as their
agent.2' The doctrine of corporate immunity or limited liability pro-
tects stockholders from such liability. But when stockholders, indi-
vidual, partnership, or corporate, no longer act merely as stockholders,
but make use of the corporation independently as principals, 24 the
corporation becomes an agent and the stockholders are properly held
liable as principals. 25 Sometimes this process is spoken of as a case
'Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921); Continental
Supply Co. v. Forrest E. Gilmore Co. of Texas, 55 S. W. (2d) 622 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1932); ANDERsoN, LIuvrATIoNs OF CORPORATE ENTITY (1931) 53,
54, 64-66, 69, 334; PowLL, op. cit supra note 11 at 107; Wormser, Piercing
the Veil of Corporate Entity (1912) 12 COL. L. Rzv. 496.
"See POUND, INTERPPETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) c. 7, The Engi-
neering Interpietation.
=The question of the nature of corporate personality as to whether
real or fictional (see Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 655) does not necessarily matter because
the results reached in the cases really rest on other considerations. (See,
however, Amos v. Trust Co. of Florida, 54 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
This is true even though the fictional character of corporate personality
is frequently asserted in the cases. See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Pierson, 222 N. Y. Supp. 532 (Sup. Ct., 1927), and Pagel, Horton & Co. v.
Harmon Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 487, 258 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1932); National
Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P. (2d) 535 (1938). That
the common law never received the fiction theory of corporations, see
Pollock, Has the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corpora-
tions? (1911) 27 L. Q. RaV. 219.
"See Opportunity Christian Church v. Washington Motor Power Co.,
136 Wash. 116, 238 Pac. 641 (1925).
"The same thought is suggested by the phrases "undue control", or
"undue dominion". See Kentucky Electric Power Co. v. Norton Coal
Mining Co., 93 F.,(2d) 923 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938); Finley v. Union Joint Stock
Land Bank of Detroit, 281 Mich. 214, 274 N. W. 768 (1937).
Adolph Ramish, Inc., v. Laugharn, 86 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936);
Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes, 95 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Jackson v.
Kirschman, - La. App. -, 173 So. 562 (1937); Havey v. Hofmann, 121 N. J.
Eq. 523, 191 At. 756 (1937).
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of disregarding the corporate entity. Strictly speaking, it should not
be so regarded, for agency principles are alone sufficient to furnish
protection. 26 It is no more necessary to disregard corporate entity in
such a case than it would be if the principal were not a stockholder but
a third person for whom the corporation acted as agent."
There are a number of cases, however, where the corporate entity
is really disregarded, 28 agency principles being insufficient to explain
such decisions. Cases of the character here mentioned are cases of
legal identity rather than cases of agency, or, as will be explained later,
cases in which the doctrine may be invoked as a matter of convenience
to enforce a duty owing to the person invoking the doctrine,29 and
certain legal consequences follow therefrom that would not follow if
mere agency principles were involved.2 0
When a court disregards the corporate entity, it does so only for
the purposes of the particular case,2 ' and for special reason.32  In all
other respects the corporation may continue as such. If it expects to be
treated as a corporation de facto or de jure and in other respects
enjoy the privileges and immunities that corporate organization af-
fords, it must conduct itself as a corporation and comply, for example,
with the law respecting meetings, officers, stock, contracts, tax regula-
tions and the like23 What the court really does is not to treat the
corporation as nonexistent, but rather to refuse to give effect to certain
incidents or immunities of corporate existence. This fact emphasizes
the necessity of determining just what there is in a particular factual
situation that requires such action of the court.2 4
The facts considered by the courts in determining whether the
corporate entity should be regarded or disregarded generally relate to
2"Floral Park Lawns v. O'Connell, 250 App. Div. 464, 294 N. Y. Supp. 991
(1937).
'For a discussion of the principle that a corporation may act as agent,
see Killingsworth v. Portland Trust Co., 18 Ore. 351, 355, 23 Pac. 66 (1890).
"Raymond-Eldredge Co. v. Security Realty Inv. Co., 91 F. (2d) 168
(C. C. A. 6th, 1937); Everets v. Sunset Farms Inc., 9 Cal. (2d) 691, 72 P.
(2d) 543 (1937); In re Turley's Estate, 169 Misc. 190, 289 N. Y. Supp. 704
(Surr. Ct. 1936); Central Trust Co. v. Sickles Holding Co., 55 Ohio App. 394,
9 N. E. (2d) 881 (1937).
"0See Section V infra and note 144 et seq. infra.
"°See note 15, supra.
"'Inconsistent positions cannot, however, be taken in the same case.
Either the entity is to be disregarded for purposes of the case or it is not.
Bradley v. Butchart, 217 Cal. 791, 20 P. (2d) 693 (1933). It has been held
that the corporate entity will be recognized in some relations but not in
others. Irving Trust Co. v. Kaminsky, 22 F. Supp. 362 (S. D. N. Y., 1937);
Adolph Ramish, Inc. v. Laugharn, 86 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
"Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 10th,
1931). When the "entity" is disregarded the court merely states a result.
The reasons must exist independently. See Comment (1926) 36 YALE L. J.
254, 259.
"1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1931) 137.
"It has been suggested that each case is sui generis. Pagel, Horton &
Co. v. Harmon Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 47, 258 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1932).
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the purpose of incorporation or the conduct of the corporation or of its
stockholders. Sometimes certain facts are held to be insufficient as in
the following illustrations: The fact that a corporation has been
organized for the purpose of limiting liability for future debts;' 5 the
fact that the corporation is organized to take advantage of privileges
denied individuals and granted corporations; 6 the fact (often referred
to) that a person or corporation owns a majority or all of the stock
of a corporation, or all except qualifying shares of dummy stockholders,
thereby controlling it; 37 and the fact that directors or officers are
common to the two corporations.3 8 Nor does the fact that a parent
corporation lends money to and finances its subsidiary necessarily war-
rant the application of the doctrine." The fact that the parent organ-
-Hoff-man Wall Paper Co. v. Hartford, 114 Conn. 531, 159 Atl. 346 (1932);
Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924); In re Richman's
Estate, 142 Misc. Rep. 103, 253 N. Y. Supp. 838 (Surr. Ct., 1931); Buckner
v. Dillard, 184 Okla. 586, 89 P. (2d) 326 (1939); National Hotel Co. v. Mot-
ley, 123 S. W. (2d) 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). See Almirall "& Co., Inc. v.
MeClement, 207 App. Div. 320, 202 N. Y. Supp. 139 (1923).
3Imar Mortgage Corp. v. Ticoli Realty Corp., 232 App. Div. 635, 251
N. Y. Supp. 71 (1931); Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate
Entity Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. Rv. 128, 141.
TPittsburgh & Buffalo Co. v. Duncan, 232 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916);
Smith v. Higgins, 102 F. (2d) 456 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Atkinson v. Reid,
185 Ark. 301, 47 S. W. (2d) 571 (1932); Wood Est. Co. v. Chanslor, 209
Cal. 241, 286 Pac. 1001 (1930); Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Carman,
219 Cal. 184, 25 P. (2d) 839 (1933); Commonwealth v. Muir, 170 Ky.
435, 186 S. W. 194 (1916); Hayhurst v. Boyd, 50 Idaho 752, 300 Pac.
895 (1931); Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Amrhein, 168 La. 139, 121 So. 602(1929); Waycross Airline Ry. Co. v. Offerman & W. Ry. Co., 109 Ga. 827,
35 S. E. 275 (1900); William Danzer & Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co.,
164 Md. 448, 165 Atl. 463 (1933); Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 287
Mass. 280, 191 N. E. 430 (1934); American Union Line, Inc. v. Oriental
Nay. Corp., 239 N. Y. 207, 146 N. E. 338 (1924); Monongahela Bridge Co.
v. Pittsburgh Traction Co., 196 Pa. 25, 46 Atl. 99 (1900); Vennerbeck &
Clase Co. v. Juergens Jewelry Co., 53 R. I. 135, 164 Atl. 509 (1933);
Stewart v. Gould, 8 Wash. 367, 36 Pac. 277 (1894); Milwaukee Toy Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 203 Wis. 493, 234 N. W. 748 (1931). See Fuller, The
Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company (1938) 51
HAiv. L. Rsv. 1373. The fact that the government owns a majority or all
of the stock of a corporation doesn't make the corporation a government
department. Amtorg Trading Corporation v. United States, 71 F. (2d)
524 (C. C. P. A., 1934); Commercial Pac. Cable Co. v. Bank, 263 Fed.
218 (S. D. N. Y., 1920), 269 Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920). Government
corporation agents aren't government agents. United States v. Strang, 254
U. S. 491 (1921). Nor have such corporations government immunity. Sloan
Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S.
549 (1922).
"Chicago Mill & Lbr. Co. v. Boatmen's Bank, 234 Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 8th,
1916); Martin v. Development Co., 240 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Has-
kell v. McClintic Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Owl
Fumigating Corp. v. Cal. Cyanide Co., 24 F. (2d) 718 (D. Del. 1928);
Jones Lumber Co. v. Wisarkana Lbr. Co., 125 Ark. 65, 187 $. W. 1068
(1916); Kniese v. Fairfax Incline Ry. Co., 96 Cal. App. 427, 274 Pac. 382
(1929) (sole stockholder principal officer); Pagel, Horton & Co. v. Harmon
Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 47, 258 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1932).
-"Owl Fumigating Corp. v. Cal. Cyanide Co., 24 F. (2d) 718 (D. Del.,
1928); Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926);
Vennerbeck & Clase Co. v. Juergens Jewelry Co., 53 R. I. 135, 164 Atl.
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ized the corporation,40 or that the subsidiary has a name similar to
that of the parent, 1 or that one corporation pledges all its property
to another corporation,42 is not considered decisive. Mere intimacy,
it has been held, is not enough.43
On the other hand, the following illustrative facts have been held
sufficient: When separate existence is colorable merely,4 or when there
is a substantial commingling of the property of the corporations result-
ing in a confusion of identities, the entity may be disregarded. 45 In
parent and subsidiary corporation cases, a most important field for
invoking the doctrine, there must be more than mere stockholder con-
trol of the entity sought to be disregarded. There must be what may
be best denoted as manipulation.46 Thus, in addition to the usual
elements of common stockholders, directors and officers, the following
facts have been relied on: Excessive financing by the parent of the
subsidiary corporation; 4" payment of the subsidiary's expenses and
losses by the parent;48 use by the parent of the subsidiary's property
509 (1933); see Kniese v. Fairfax Incline Ry. Co., 96 Cal. App. 427, 274 Pac.
382 (1929); Briggs & Co. v. Harper Clay Products Co., 160 Wash. 235, 272
Pac. 962 (1928).
"Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Garden City Co.,
123 Kan. 659, 256 Pac. 983 (1927).
"Knott v. Fisher Vehicle Co., 190 S. W. 378 (Mo. App., 1916); see Win.
Wrigley, Jr. Co. v. Larson, Jr. Co., 5 F. (2d) 731 (N. D. Ill., 1925).
12Overstreet v. Citizens Bank, 12 Okla. 383, 72 Pac. 379 (1903).
"See note 129, infra. Intimacy is significant. Portsmouth Cotton Oil
Ref. Corp. v. Bank, 280 Fed. 879 (M. D. Ala., 1922); McDonald v. Charles-
ton R. R., 93 Tenn. 281, 24 S. W. 252 (1893).
"Martin v. Development Co., 240 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); United
States Smelting R. & M. D. Co. v. Wallapai Co., 27 Ariz. 126, 230 Pac.
1109 (1924); Wall Paper Co., Inc. v. Hartford, 114 Conn. 531, 159 AtU. 346
(1932); Hill v. Jones, 118 Conn. 12, 170 Atl. 154 (1934); Old Ben Coal Co.
v. Universal Coal Co., 248 Mich. 486, 227 N. W. 794 (1929). Apt illustra-
tions of the rule will be found in Continental Supply Co. v. Forrest E.
Gilmore Co., 55 S. W. (2d) 622 (Tex. Civ. App., 1932); Gullett Gin Co. v.
Hicks, 176 Ga. 652, 168 S. E. 597 (1933).
'Associated Oil Co. v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204, 19 P. (2d)
940 (1933); Keane v. Watson Co., 149 Wash. 424, 271 Pac. 73 (1928); see
note 15, supra.
"In re First Nat. Bank of Arthur, Ill., 23 F. Supp. 255 (E. D. Ill., 1938).
It has been suggested that there must be control tantamount to compulsion
before the entity is disregarded. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Radio
Corporation, - Del. Ch. -, 194 Atl. 414 (1937). It has also been said that
there must be "undue control" before the entity is disregarded. Finley v.
Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit, 274 N. W. 768, 281 Mich. 214
(1937). Gledhill v. Fisher & Co., 272 Mich. 353, 262 N. W. 371 (1935) uses
the term "undue dominion".
"See Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 287 Mass. 280, 191 N. E. 430
(1934) (inadequate capital); cf. Burrows v. Emery, 285 Mich. 86, 280 N.
W. 120 (1938).
"Stark Elec. R. Co. v. McGinty Contracting Co., 238 Fed. 657, 662 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1917); Joseph R. Foard Co. v. Maryland, 219 Fed. 827 (C. C. A.
4th, 1914). Especially if the corporation has inadequate capital. Lucken-
bach Steamship Co. v. U. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920),
cert. denied, 254 U. S. 644 (1920); Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair,
287 Mass. 280, 191 N. E. 430 (1934).
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as his or its own;"' description by the parent of the subsidiary as a
part of its business; 0 the acts of the subsidiary in the interest of the
parent, rather than its own interest;"' the fact that the subsidiary has
no business except with a parent corporation, and no assets except those
conveyed to it by the parent corporation; 5" the fact that formal legal
requirements such as meetings, elections, and separate bookkeeping de-
vices are not observed by the subsidiary.53
In cases of individuals or partnerships using a corporation as a con-
venience for the transaction of the business of such individuals or
partnerships, the corporate entity has been disregarded, 54 with appar-
ently greater freedom than is manifest in cases involving parent and
subsidiary corporations, although there would seem to be no distinc-
tion in the legal principles to be applied. 55
"Edward Finch Co. v. Robie, 12 F. (2d) 360 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Mina-
han v. Timm, 210 Wis. 689, 247 N. W. 321 (1933); see Wilkinson v. Walker,
294 Fed. 939 (N. D. Tex., 1923); see dissenting opinion in Sommer v. Yakima
Motor Coach Co., 174 Wash. 638, 659, 26 P. (2d) 92 (1933). The burden of
proving good faith and adequacy of consideration in such case is on parent
corporation. Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Brown, 229 Fed. 444 (E. D. Pa.,
1916), 235 Fed. 669 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916), cert. denied, 242 U. S. 646 (1917).
5°See Platt v. Bradner, 131 Wash. 573, 230 Pac. 633 (1924).
"Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n, 247 U. S.
490 (1918); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1920); Westinghouse
Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 176 Fed. 362 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910);
In re Eilers Music House, 270 Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921); Costan v. Manila
Elec. Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); see Rippel v. Kaplus, 124 N. J.
Eq. 303, 1 A. (2d) 883 (1938). See also Berle, Subsidiary Corporations and
Credit Manipulation (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 874.
"Portsmouth C. Oil Ref. Corp. v. Bank, 280 Fed. 879 (M. D. Ala., 1922);
The Willem Van Driel, Sr., 252 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918); see United
States v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 238 U. S. 516 (1915).
"TIn re Barreiro's Estate, - Cal. App. -, 13 P. (2d) 1033 (Cal. App.,
1932). The rule assumes the valid existence of the corporation, at least
in form. It should be distinguished from the rule holding persons liable
individually or as partners who act as a corporation without complying
with the law-Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass. 249, 19 N. E. 342 (1889);
Rowden v. Daniell, 151 Mo. App. 15, 132 S. W. 23 (1910); Empire Mills v.
Alston Grocery Co., 15 S. W. 200, 505 (Tex. App., 1891);, cf. Refsnes v.
Myers, 164 Wash. 205, 2 P. (2d) 656 (1931), and Burstein v. Palermo, 104
N. J. Law 414, 140 Atl. 326 (1928), or who act as such after charter expires.
Ewald Iron Co. v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 692, 131 S. W. 774 (1910). But
observance of formalities is not conclusive. The court may still pierce
the entity. Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S., 330 (1918); Westinghouse
Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 176 Fed 362 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910).
See Bishop v U. S., 16 F.' (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). See generally:
POWELL, op. cit. supra note 11, c. 2; Berle, loc. cit. supra note 51; Elson,
Legal Liability of Holding Companies for Acts of Subsidiary Companies
(1930) 15 ST. Louis L. REv. 333; Comment (1936) 21 ST. Louis L. REV. 234.
"Clark v. Schwaegler, 104 Wash: 12, 175 Pac. 300 (1918) (convenience
of community); DeLano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 Pac. 273 (1926);
The Sheffield Company v. R. Hoe & Company, 173 Wash. 489, 23 P. (2d)
876 (1933); cf. note 89, infra.
'Thus in Washington, while insisting on the necessity of confusion of'
assets in dominant and subsidiary corporation cases before the entity will
be disregarded, no such requirement is mentioned in one-man or family
corporations. The requirement seems unduly strict. See note 54, supra.
See also Burnet v. Commonwealth Imp. Co., 287 U. S. 415 (1932).
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III.
THE DuTy OWED IN EACH CASE INVOLVING THE DOCTRINE
While the facts of each case, in which the doctrine of disregarding the
corporate entity is applied, vary,56 there is one situation common to all:
a right owned and its corresponding duty owed to the person demanding
recognition of his right and the performance of its corresponding
duty.5 7 For example, the obligee of a contract has a right to receive
performance of its obligations. The obligor, on the other hand, is under
a corresponding duty to perform those obligations. When the doctrine
of disregard is applied, it is applied because of the necessity of en-
forcing this right-duty. The nature and origin of these right-duties
will be described in detail hereinafter.58 That such a right-duty exists
is presupposed in asserting a cause of action or in relying upon a de-
fense. Its existence is assumed but not often expressed. When ex-
pressed it has usually been expressed in a restricted form, namely, by
a holding that before a corporate entity is disregarded, some species of
fraud, bad faith or other wrong must exist to be obviated,59 the stock-
holders of the corporation whose entity is sought to be disregarded
being chargeable with the violation of the duty. 60 But such cases often
mean nothing more than that violation of duty (denoted as fraud) will
result if the entity be not disregarded. Were the rule otherwise, it
would be unduly confining, it having been held that actual fraud need
See note 34, supra.
"In Williams v. Freeport Sulphur Co., 40 S. W. (2d) 817, 825 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1930), the court said:
"The denial by the Texas Company of the right of its stockholders to
an inspection of its books and records is a violation of its duty to plain-
tiffs enjoined both by the common law and statutes of this state . . .
And it cannot . . . prevent the courts of this state from compelling the
performance of that duty, by setting up the legal fiction of the separate
entity of the sulphur company."
The person to whom the duty is owed need not await action by the
state before complaining of corporate personality. He may do so to the
end that the duty owed be enforced. See Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elect.
Co., 144 Fed. 765 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906).
6'See Section IV, infra.
"In re John Koke Co., 38 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); In re Arm-
bruster Store Co., 66 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); Erkenbrecher v.
Grant, 187 Cal. 7, 200 Pac. 641 (1921); Continental Securities & Inv. Co.
v. Rawson, 208 Cal. 228, 280 Pac. 954 (1929); Hollywood Cleaning Co. v.
Hollywood Service, 217 Cal. 124, 17 P. (2d) 709 (1932); Continental &
Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Garden City Co., 123 Kan. 659, 256
Pac. 983 (1927); Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N. Y. 319, 172 N. E. 521 (1930);
Moody-Seagraves Ranch v. Brown, 69 S. W. (2d) 840 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1934); First National Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928);
Briggs & Co. v. Harper Clay Products Co., 150 Wash. 235, 272 Pac. 962
(1928); Kelley v. Von Herberg, 184 Wash. 165, 50 P. (2d) 23 (1935).
"If other stockholders are innocent, the doctrine cannot be invoked at
least to their prejudice. See Weaver v. Atlantian Const. Co., 84 Cal. App.
154, 258 Pac. 111 (1927); Spear v. H. V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 140
N. E. 795 (1923); Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P. (2d) 396 (1932).
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not exist,61 it being enough if "inequitable results" would follow if the
entity were not disregarded. 2 The term "inequitable results" is vague
and general. Properly interpreted, however, in the light of the facts
of the particular case, it will in last analysis be found to mean nothing
more than violation of duty owed or obstruction to the realization of
the right asserted. 83 Indeed, in cases adopting the "substance" or
"justice" rule, the corporate entity has been disregarded without ex-
press reference to the existence of either fraud or inequitable results.
The enforcement of the duty owed requiring it, the courts disregarded
the corporate entity by refusing to give effect to the claimed incident
of corporate status."1
(To be continued)
'Hamilton Ridge Lumber & Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F. (2d) 592
(C. C. A. 4th, 1928) (constructive fraud enough); In re Otsego Waxed
Paper Co., 14 F. Supp. 15 (W. D. Mich., 1935); People ex rel. Potter v.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 246 Mich. 198, 224 N. W. 438 (1929); Fors
v. Farrell, 271 Mich. 358, 260 N. W. 886 (1935); Associated Oil Co. v.
Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204, 19 P. (2d) 940 (1933) (unintended
probable fraud enough).
"In re Otsego Waxed Paper Co., 14 F. Supp. 15 (W. D. Mich., 1935)
(no fraud being involved, the corporate entity was disregarded in bank-
ruptcy); Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921); Wenban v.
Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924); Bellaire Securities Corporation
v. Brown, 124 Fla. 47, 168 So. 625 (1936); see Grimes v. Brammer, 214
Iowa 405, 239 N. W. 550 (1931).
"See note 111, infra. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Dennis, 256 App. Div. 495,
10 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 710 (1939), the court refused to disregard a corporate
entity in absence of a showing that fraud or other breach of duty was
involved.
"Trustees System Co. of Pa. v. Payne, 65 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934);
Montgomery v. Central National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 142, 255 N. W.
274 (1934); Gallatin Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 79 Mont. 269,
256 Pac. 373 (1927); Law v. McLaughlin, 2 F. Supp. 601 (N. D. Cal., 1933); see
Phoenix Safe Investment Co. v. James, 28 Ariz. 514, 237 Pac. 958 (1925);
State Trust & Say. Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co., 30 N. L 566, 240
Pac. 469 (1925); and In re Culhane's Estate, 269 Mich. 68, 256 N. W. 807
(1934); see notes 93 and 111, infra.
